April 16, 1997

Defense Secretaries Oppose It: Secretary of State Supports It .

On April 8, 1997, three former Secretaries of Defense in Republican administrations appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urging Senators to vote against ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). They are: James Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense under Presidents Nixon and Ford; Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense under President Ford; and Caspar Weinberger, who held that same post under President Reagan. In addition, a letter from Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense for President George Bush, was read into the record.

On that same day, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright testified in support of Senate ratification of the CWC.

This paper quotes the statements made by these former Republican administration and current Democrat administration officials and highlights the comments made by the Republican Chairman and another Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Views of Senator Helms

In his opening statement, Committee Chairman Jesse Helms commented on the historical significance of the hearing, that it was "the first time that three distinguished former U.S. secretaries of defense have ever appeared together before a Senate committee to oppose ratification of an arms control treaty." Senator Helms discussed his opposition to the treaty on the grounds that "it is not global, it is not verifiable, it is not constitutional, and it will not work."

Views of Senator Lugar

Senator Lugar, a member of the Committee who supports the treaty, stated that after much consideration, he was unpersuaded by the Defense Secretaries' arguments. The Senator disputed the critics by arguing that the Convention would not undermine current U.S. export controls, would not constrain our ability to provide for chemical defenses, and would not jeopardize confidential business information.

Quotes from Republican Secretaries of Defense

[NOTE: Excerpts have been edited slightly from the Federal News Service

transcript of spoken remarks. Emphasis has been added by RPC.]

The United States Is Better Off Without the Treaty

"The technology to manufacture chemical weapons is simply too ubiquitous, covert chemical warfare programs too easily concealed, and the international community's record of responding effectively to violations of arms control treaties too unsatisfactory to permit confidence that such a regime would actually reduce the chemical threat. Indeed, some aspects of the present convention, notably its obligation to share with potential adversaries like Iran, chemical manufacturing technology that can be used for military purposes and chemical defensive equipment, threaten to make this accord worse than having no treaty at all." [Richard Cheney, Letter to Chairman Helms, 4/7/97]

"...I wonder if I might answer another of Senator Kerry's questions, which is: Do you think we are better off by not signing this protocol? My answer is unequivocally yes; we are better off by not signing it because this particular protocol not only has all of the faults that we pointed out and is not verifiable, but it does require us to share both defensive and offensive technological developments that we should be working on to protect our troops. And that I think is a very deep flaw."

[Caspar Weinberger]

"We have a convention which is already in force. So it's not a question of something is better than nothing because we already have something. That something prohibits the use of chemical weapons. It is easier to detect the use of chemical weapons than it will ever be to detect the manufacture of chemical weapons.

[James Schlesinger]

Obligation to Provide Chemical Technology to Rogue Countries

"Article X of the treaty requires that signatories have a right to acquire CW defensive technologies from other signatories. This may mean that the United States is obliged to share such technologies with Iran, Cuba and other such nations that may sign the convention....But even if the Senate were able to prevent such obligatory transfers, it is plain that Article X legitimizes such transfers by other industrial nations which will argue they are obliged to do so by the treaty. Clearly that undercuts any sanctions directed against rogue nations that happen to sign the convention."

[James Schlesinger]

"I think that you can make it clear that the use of poison gas is outlawed by public opinion around the world. You can get statements to that effect. But when you add to that the enormously intrusive processes which require us to share with some extremely potentially hostile countries defensive mechanisms that we may be working on to improve our capability of defending against this type of warfare, then I think you are neglecting the best interests of the United States. And that's one of the reasons why this convention should not be ratified."

[Caspar Weinberger]

Potential for Industrial Espionage

"I trust that the committee will delve deeply into this issue (of industrial espionage) because scuttlebutt has it that the White House has indicated to senior FBI officials that they are to say nothing against this treaty. And consequently, you may wish to examine not only present but former counter-intelligence officers."

[James Schlesinger]

"I was told yesterday by an individual who is knowledgeable that personnel from the Lawrence-Livermore laboratory were involved in one of the mock inspections conducted by the U.S. government and that they evaluated the inspection results and, using modern technology, they were perfectly capable of coming away with classified and proprietary information from the inspection."

[Donald Rumsfeld]

"Most of us in business are engaged with joint ventures and partnerships with companies across the globe and we share proprietary information in the same facility. And were these inspections to be imposed, it's entirely possible that not only your own proprietary information would be compromised, but so would the proprietary information of joint venture partners."

[Donald Rumsfeld]

False Claims of CWC Proponents

"This treaty will not serve to banish the threat of chemical weapons. It will not aid in the fight against terrorism. As the Japanese cult Aum Shinriko has demonstrated, a significant volume of lethal nerve gas can be produced in a facility as small as eight feet by fifteen feet. . . . Nor will this treaty 'provide our children broad protection against the threat of chemical attacks.' Such statements merely disguise, and thereby increase, our vulnerability to terrorist attacks. To the extent that others learn from international sharing of information on CW defenses, our vulnerability is enhanced rather than diminished. Finally, this treaty in no way helps, 'shield our soldiers from one of battlefield's deadliest killers.' As indicated earlier, only the threat of effective retaliation provides such protection. That we would respond in the event of an attack on our troops has great credibility, and thus serves as an effective deterrent. The Chemical Weapons Convention adds no more to this protection of our troops than did the Geneva Convention."

[James Schlesinger]

International Inspections of U.S. Facilities

"These inspectors under the treaty, Articles X and XI, would have powers that basically American enforcement agents do not. Even the IRS, even the Department of Justice, cannot wander around the country without search warrants and demand to see anything they want to see in thousands of factories."

[Caspar Weinberger]

Costs of Administering the CWC

"The costs involved are not just the 25 percent of the cost of administering the treaty and all of the inspections that we would find so intrusive and so violative of what we believe to be our constitutional rules against unreasonable search and seizure, or seizing of property without due process. We could add the $70 million we have already given Russia under the so-called Bilateral Destruction Act to which the Russians have announced they no longer will be bound by."

[Caspar Weinberger]

"I note that there would be considerable cost to the taxpayers in that the convention provides for the use of a U.N. style funding formula which calls for the United States to pay some 25 percent of the total. In addition, there would be costs to private industry, which I don't believe can be properly quantified at present in that it's not possible yet to know how the mechanisms to police this convention would actually work. And this is to say nothing of the cost to companies of trying to protect proprietary information from compromise. These costs would amount in a real sense to unfunded mandates on American enterprise."

[Donald Rumsfeld]

What Happens If the Senate Fails to Ratify

"One result of the Senate not ratifying the treaty will be admittedly expressions of concern by some of our friends and allies around the world. But I suspect there would be no smiles from the rogue states. And the world would be spared the deception which would follow ratification, because the world will not be led to have erroneously believed that the threat of chemical weapons has been effectively dealt with. And I submit that we will be spared the complacency that Secretary Schlesinger mentioned, which I think would follow ratification. Further, small- and medium-sized companies will be spared the costs and the risks to their proprietary information which would result from U.S. participation."

[Donald Rumsfeld]

Verification

"I don't believe that it's verifiable -- nor have I met a single knowledgeable person who believes that it is verifiable. It might reduce chemical weapons in arsenals in some countries, but it's debatable whether the treaty would reduce chemical arsenals in any of the nations potentially hostile to the United States. Countries identified by the United States as possessing chemical weapons that have not signed the CWC -- let alone ratified it -- include Libya, Syria, Iraq, North Korea. And certainly these countries are among the most likely to use chemical weapons against our citizens and our soldiers and our allies."

[Donald Rumsfeld]

Compliance

"In addition, there are countries that might sign the convention which would not be reliable with respect to compliance. Since the convention is not verifiable, that's not a trivial problem. For example, even if Iran does ratify the agreement, we really can't rely on them to comply with its terms. Also, it's my understanding that Russia has yet to fulfill its obligations under the 1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement. And Washington newspapers and Jane's have recently reported that the Russians have developed new nerve agents that are designed in a manner that would make discovery next to impossible, and that they are apparently comprised of common commercial chemicals.

[Donald Rumsfeld]

"Just because it [the CWC] has a very intrusive mechanism, which allows you to go into these 10,000 and more companies in the United States, or similar numbers in other countries of the world, does not mean that there is any guarantee that any of these countries that are signatories to it are in effect going to be doing what they say they're going to do."

[Caspar Weinberger]

Impact on Small Businesses

"...I don't believe that the thousands of companies across this country know about this treaty in any detail, believe that the treaty would apply to them, understand that they could be subjected to inspections, or appreciate the unfunded mandates that would be imposed on them in the event this were to pass."

[Donald Rumsfeld]

On the Loss of Sources and Methods

"When David Kay [chief U.N. weapons inspector for Iraq following the Gulf War] was in charge of the inspection in Iraq, he discovered, to his chagrin, that the Iraqis had been able to hide from Western intelligence their activities. Why? Because Iraqis themselves had been trained by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] in the techniques used by Western, specifically American intelligence. Now, the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons is engaged in training people from all nations at this juncture. What we are doing in the intelligence area is probably suffering a net loss. We will have greater access and, therefore, we will have increased intelligence of one type, but our techniques for interpretation will be compromised."

[James Schlesinger]

Quotes from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

Value of the CWC

"We decided years ago to renounce the use of these weapons and to begin destroying our own chemical weapons stockpiles. Thus, the CWC will not deprive us of any military option we would ever use against others. But it would help ensure that others never use chemical weapons against us. In considering the value of this treaty, we must bear in mind that today keeping and producing chemical weapons are legal."

"By ratifying the CWC, we will assume the lead in shaping a new and effective legal regime. We will be in a position to challenge those who refuse to give up those poisonous weapons. We will provide an added measure of security for the men and women of our Armed Forces. We will protect American industry and American jobs, and we will make our citizens safer than they would be in a world where chemical arms remain legal."

"I believe that we gain greatly by having, first of all, the added intelligence capability that comes from having an international regime, and second, the force of being a part of an international regime. . . . So this is a force multiplier for us, as a country that no longer plans to use chemical weapons ourselves and knows that others still have them."

Penalties Provided by the Treaty

"And countries outside the CWC will be subject to trade restrictions, whether or not they are known to possess chemical weapons. These penalties would not exist without the treaty. They will make it more costly for any nation to have chemical weapons, and more difficult for rogue states or terrorists [to] acquire materials needed to produce them."

What Happens if the Senate Does Not Ratify the CWC

"The problem states will never accept a prohibition on chemical weapons if America stays out, keeps them company, and gives them cover. We will not have the standing to mobilize our allies to support strong action against violators if we ourselves have refused to join the treaty being violated."

"Moreover, if we fail to ratify the agreement by the end of April, we would forfeit our seat on the treaty's executive council for at least one year, thereby losing the right to help draft the rules by which the convention would be enforced. We would lose the right to help administer and conduct inspections. And because of the trade restrictions imposed on non-member states, our chemical manufacturers are concerned that they would risk serious economic loss."

Constitutional Issues

"Some have expressed the view that the inspection requirements of the CWC could raise constitutional problems here in the United States. However, the CWC provides explicitly that inspections will be conducted according to each nation's constitutional process."

Verification

"This treaty does have certain issues raised about verification. But our estimation is that the treaty can verify and does verify problems where there can be a massive problem or a large military problem for the United States."

Rogue Nations

"I think that it is exactly because of our concern over the rogue states that we have to try to use the tools that the international regime puts before us. And I think that what happens here is, first of all, that it becomes even more clear that the rogue states are isolated politically and that they are subject to trade sanctions that put pressure on their economies and limits their ability to obtain the ingredients for chemical weapons...If they sign up and then try to cheat, the rogue states will be subject to the CWC's unprecedented verification measures, and they'll probably get caught. And when they are caught, they will be subject to international pressure and other CWC sanctions."